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Dear friends in peace, war has been given a bad name as Df la/e, and 
it is not that often that a peace researcher/educator/worker is invited to 
address a military academy. I interpret this as a sign of another Cold War 
receding, another dialogue opening, and have accepted the invitation with 
gratitude and with an open mind. My basic thesis is that peace is too 
important to be sacrificed at the altar Df unneeessary conlliet between those 
struggling for peaee with and without uniform, not thereby saying that 
everybody, in uniform or not, is equally devoted to peace. And we may split 
over whether peaee is obtainable by peaeeful means or by violent means. I 
would be optimistie about peace as the road to pace, to quote Gandhi, and 
skeptical about violent approaehes. For the latter I have two obvious eounter-
arguments, two versions of the old adage that violenee breeds violenee. 
Violenee tends to become addictive; in the vanquished who dreams of 
revenge, as also in the victor who dreams af more victories. 
But let us leave that aside, and foeus on the military in transition. My 
talk is divided into three parts, maybe in the evangelieal tradition of the 
eountry in whieh I was bom, Norway: - if the military is in transition, then 
why, what went wrong? - separating sin from the sinners, what are the 
military virtues? - what are the new tasks for the military, using those virtues? 
You do not have to aeeept the words used to define the enormous issue I am 
trying to explore; the tripartite division may still be helpful to reach some 
concJusions, however tentative. 
What went wrong was already elear at the time Df the First World War 
(1914-18), perhaps also during lhe American Civil War (1861-65). War had 
been given a bad name: the losses were unaeceptable for both winner and 
loser('). Moreover, the eivilian losses were inereasing; the idea of fighting to 
(1) There is much material abaut this in John Keegan's excellenl A Hislory of Waifare, New York. 
Vintage Books, 1993. 
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protect the civilians became meaningless. There was massive protest toward the 
end, desertion, revolts, soldiers' strikes; the kind of thing also known from 
superpower warfare in Viêt Nam and Afghanistan. Nothing of his prevented the 
Second World War from being even worse; and for this cruel century as a whole 
the percentage of civilian casualties increased from a low 10% toward 90%. 
The Clausewitzian war as a means, using the Regimenten to achieve the 
political goals of the state, was a catastrophe. This presupposed a high levei 
of civilian control of the military in order to make them fight against their 
better instincts, presented to the naive as «democratic» control. It also 
presupposed an ésprit de corps more easily developed when war was also 
sport and a way of displaying courage and gaining honor, not massive 
butchery of everything between the means and the goal. 
So the military became a way of obtaining what the political elites 
wanted. Being destructive, they could order the military to destroy other 
countries or other social classes, as opposed to just having violent encounters, 
deciding who was stronger, assuming that God was on the side of the winner 
and that's it. The winner takes ali that was at stake, and the conflict is over. 
This is an important reason why submission to a democratically elected 
parliament is an insufficient guarantee. And why defense intellectuals are the 
most hawkish. They risk nothing. 
And a reason why they search for ever higher leveis civilian legitimacy 
to launch a war: a NATOIWEU-EU/OSCE/UNSC decision to go ahead, even 
«with ali necessary means» as in Security Council resolution 678, the Gulf 
War. Ever higher up, a desperate search for the Father-Sky somewhere who 
is a causa sua and does not have to worry about legitimation: He is His own. 
To say that mesa war, the e1assical war between states with middle range 
weapons, has been given a bad name is not the same as guaranteeing it is 
on its way out. But these wars are rare, and they are not increasing. Macro 
war, with major genocide, such as Auschwitz, Hiroshima-Nagasaki and olher 
Second World War enormities have ispo facto a bad name; which again does 
not insure us against them. The real problem today is obviously micro war, 
fought with hand guns and land mines, with machete, with the bombs of the 
terrorist and the electro-shocks of the torturist. To take only one example: if 
only 20 of the 2000 nations in the world have realized the dream of a multi-
-national nation-slate, and there are about 200 countries in the world, then 
there are 1980 wars still to go in 180 countries, mainly micro wars, except 
when «mother countries» enter. Obviously, other solutions must be found, and 
I am coming lo some of them. 
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The distinction, not mine, has been made above between the «poli ti cal 
goals of the state» and the «military virtues 01' the Regiment». Clausewitz' 
formula for modern warfare was obviously to subordinate the latler to the 
former, with catastraphic consequences. This has then led to absurd 
consequences in what we might call postmodern warfare: the military killing 
civilian rather than military. The latler might be able to hit back. 
Which are lhe military virtues we might like to build on for a more 
peaceful world? Here is a short list: 
- courage, pure physical courage, even facing a superior enemy; 
- discipline, ability to obey (but not blind cadaver discipline); 
- ésprit de corps, collective identitication in an age of egoism; 
- organization, with good logistics, punctuality, precision. 
These four virtues turn into caricatures and vices when put at the disposal 
of very wrong and very violent policies. When used for the right purposes 
they are virtues indeed, something fram which we in the peace movement, 
for instance, could learn a 101. 
At this point a major discussion may open up: should the organization 
be alpha or beta, large, hierarchical armies or small, relatively autonomous 
units with horizontal command? The type of military I would believe most 
in for defense, defensive defense units, almost have to be 01' the beta variety 
as they may presuppose that occupation has already taken place. This is also 
the general trend in organization theory: smaller, more equality. 
Of course the military are not alone in inculcating such virtues in the 
soldiers, at ali ranks. No organization, protit or not protit, national or inter-
national, can do without something of the last three. So what is characteristic 
of the military is the physical courage, and the other three are in a sense 
subservient to that one. To walk into tire is not a natural human inclination. 
Discipline from without (commands, sticks and carrots) and within (inner 
motivation, honor) may be necessary. In addition, the «buddy principIe», to 
help in order to be helped, to avenge in order to be avenged. And superb 
organization, with nothing missing at the criticaI momenl. 
Let us now imagine that we have these millions of military around the worId, 
with dedication and organization, but in search of new missions, functions. Like 
an organization built to tight TBC (an infectious disease) turns to cancer (a 
modernization disease), the military will turn to something. To what? 
Let us first examine some non-answers. 
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Countries Wilhout Armies. Being a conscientious objector myself I of 
course welcome this trend, today including something between 23 and 28 
countries, depending on how one counts('). But there are three major 
problems. 
First, abolition of the military may solve a very important problem: the use 
of the military against other social classes, as coup d'élal upwards in society, 
ar as state terrorism, often combined with torturism, downwards. It also solves 
the problem of making the country incapable of attacking others. But it does 
not solve the problem of what to do if other social classes ar other countries 
attack. Some alternative means of defense have to be put inta place, both of the 
country and of the internai social arder, provided they have legitimacy. 
Second, if small countries abolish ar do not acquire armies, they lay 
themselves open to «protectioo», by some Big Brother who would hate to see 
some other Big Brother doing the samee). 
Third, abolition of the army does not solve the problem of how to use 
the capacities and virtues of the military for peace. Thus, in the debate in 
Switzerland fali 1989 about the referendum to abolish the Swiss Army by the 
Year 2000 (35.6% voted in favor, causing shockwaves in the Swiss Army) 
alternatives received scant attention, except for the idea of national service 
for alI. 
Conversion for civilian purposes. The conversion model differs from the 
abolition/non-acquisition model in being more gradual, and not necessarily 
ending with total abolition. In addition, this offers an approach more acceptable 
to bigger, even «great» military powers. The three problems above apply also 
here, but less so. But then there are some other problems. 
Conversion, unless close to total, represents no break with the classical 
military tradition. The deplorable patterns of the past can be reinstated with 
no difficulty; there is no need to find new responses to problems of outer and 
inner security. 
In addition, conversion may not weaken the military destructive capacity, 
and may even strengthen it. If what is converted is people, taken fram the 
forces and put into the economy - assuming that to be possible given the 
(2) C. Barbey, Pays .vans Armée.f, 198.9, identifies 28 countries without annies. and 18 demilitarized 
territories. Edouard Dommen. UNCTAD, Geneve. has a slightJy reduced Iist af 25 states, inc1uding 
Iceland, Andorra. Holy Sec, Liechtenstein and Monaco from Europe. 
C) Thus. Barbey, op. dI .. points ou! lhat 13 countries af lhe 28 have intemationaJ defense lrealies, 
5 with lhe USA. 2 with New Zealand. I with France. I with Nepal. I with Papua New Guinea, I with 
Senegal, one with lhe UK, and one with NATO (Luxembourg). 
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present endcmic unemployment - then the military will probably switch to 
more capital-intensive modes. If what is converted is capital. taken from the 
military budget and put into social welfare, ar lower taxes - assuming that 
to be possible given the present endemic budget deficits - then the military 
will probably switch to more technology-intensive, ar more labor-intensive, 
modes. And so on, like aetio leads to reaetia, conversian leads to reconversion. 
An additional point, today particularly visible in Russia, applies to both 
approaches. The military is also a way of making a living, having a secure 
income, at least basic needs guarantees as a soldier. There is even a relatively 
secure pension, in the end protected by the military capacity to control the 
state. In addition, abolition ar conversion does not inspire any great enthusiasm; 
any reader may try it out against his own profession. 
The alternatives open to the military are in a sense obvious. I am not 
thinking of just any big project in need of a big, well disciplined organization, 
such as reconstruction and relief after natural (hurricane, tsunami, earthquake), 
social (internaI and externaI wars), and ecological (erosion, deforestation, 
desertification) catastrophes. That kind of work can equally well, ar much 
better, be dane by well organized, dedicated people with no military training 
aI alI. I am thinking of alternatives having to with lhe military as such. 
NEW TASK I: DEFENSIVE NONOFFENSIVE NONPROVOCATIVE DEFENSE 
If the military has been used offensively against other countries and 
social groups, then this is where defense has to be built. For the case of 
externaI attack a mix of conventional military defense (CMD), para-military 
defense (PMD) and non-military defense (NMD) may serve to make the 
country relatively immune to attacks('). One of them alone may not do; the 
three together may easily make a prospective invader hesitate: «I can take that 
country and occupy it, but it will lead to endless problems with short-range 
attacks, hidden attacks and the whole population noncooperating and 
disobeying». Micro instead of mesa defense. 
Obviously, the military will have very important roles to play in CMD 
and PMD; NM being more complex if we think of the moral commitment not 
e> See my There Are Allerna/ives, Nottinghum, Spokesman. 1984 for an elaboration af this 
concept, particularly Chapter 5, and the excellent newsleUer NOD & Crmversúm from ther Centre for 
Peace and eonflict Research, in Copenhagen. 
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lo use violence. Bul lhe mililary are also mainly civilians. Why should Iheir 
virlues nol be made use of? Defensive defense is a commilmenl nol lo hil 
lhe civilian populalion on lhe olher side, Ihal is already a slep loward 
nonviolence. Defensive defense may open for more commilmenl lo non 
violence among lhe mililary, and Ihereby poinl lo lhe fulure. 
LeI us play a little wilh these words. There is offensive offense, also 
known as aggression: just march on, march in, hit, grab. Ministries of war 
used lo do Ihal kind of Ihing earlier in Ihis cenlury. Today aggression is oflen 
considered nol only immoral and illegilimale, bul - even worse - ouldaled 
by hislory. AI leasl some prelext has lo be offered beyond lusl for war and 
greed for booly, such as lhe need to pre-empl aggression by lhe olher side. 
As lhe saying used lO go, allack is lhe besl defence. The resull mighl be called 
defensive offense. 
And yel il smacks of hypocrisy; moreover, il runs against lhe rule Ihal 
the parly Ihal tired lhe tirsl shol is guilty of aggression, regardless of rationale 
for doing so. Better wail for lhe olher to slarl, and only Ihen launch a full-
-scale attack. In olher words, offensive defense; offensive capabilily inside a 
defensive poslure. Minis/ries oi defense are based on Ihis. 
However, even if lhe inlention is fully defensive (which it usually is nOI), 
any offensive capabilily makes any olher side wonder whal is really going 
on. Inlentions are cheap, only some words; capabililies are coslly, lols of 
hardware. Olhers mighl draw lhe conclusion thal offensive defense, or even 
offensive offense is being conlemplated; a basic dilemma of lhe «forward 
slralegies» of bolh parties in lhe Cold War. 
Out of Ihis predicamenl carne the fourlh possibilily: defensive defense. 
If your inlenlions are purely defensive, Ihen leI your capabililies prove your 
words. And in Ihal language lhe physical range and precision of lhe weapons 
syslems (CEP), speak louder Ihan soothing words from lhe vocabulary of 
defensive inlent. Secrel services are supposed to tind lhe hidden lrulh. 
One example: is the defensive defense poslure of a democracy known as 
a reliable superpower clienl credible, or would even a diclatorial non-clienl 
be more credible? During lhe Cold War, was more Ihreal to olher counlries 
emanating from Norway, or from Rumania? As lhe example indicales, 
there are many faclors lo take inlo account for anyone exploring defensive 
defense. 
Ali Ihese approaches have one thing in common: some kind of roll-back, 
hedgehog Iype of defense. Olhers should have no reason lo worry, should not 
feel provoked (even if Ihey say they are). Bul Ihey should nol doubl lhe 
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resolve to fight back, and from ali cells in the social body so to speak, if the 
country is attacked. 
Looking at the wasteland produced by twentieth century wars we find, 
as mentioned above, a compatible trend: the tendency for intemational wars 
to decrease, and intra-national wars to conquer, ar to secede from, a government, 
to be on the increase. Wars, like telephone calls, can be shart or long distance; 
but the short distance wars come with ample support from some long distance 
operatars of Cold War fame. The compatibility becomes a two-edged, and not 
very defensive sword: on the one hand less long-range weapons for less long-
-range wars (ex-Yugoslavia, ex-Soviet Union, Africa); on the other hand, 
weapons that do not provoke peoples far away may be very lethal applied next 
door. A transarmament to short range weapons, hence, may be a recipe for 
short range vlolence; meaning only recommendable to countries with no 
major inner contradictions, be that class (revolution) or national (secession), 
ar both. Defensive defense as CMD and PMD does not answer the objections 
raised by pacifists. NMD, as an integral part of defensive defense, is a better 
answer. 
Defensive defense built on shart range weapons systems runs into another 
problem. Rapid deployment forces associated with strong powers disciplining 
the weak are eliminated. But how about peacekeeping forces coming together 
from many parts of the world trying to do exactly that, keep peace') To the 
extent they are not (too) offensive, meaning violent, they are not rulcd out 
by that concep!. The general posture, the training, lhe verbal and nonverbal 
discourses matter. But Iong range logistic capacity for weapons' carriers is 
a good reaSOB far a suspicion that could be assuaged by laying them open 
to international inspection. 
Then a third somewhat promising trails in the wasteland, this time a 
bird's eye view of the history of warfare. From the distant past we sense 
primitive warfare, wild, disorganized, with much hue and cry till the first drop 
of blood or the first body is on the ground. War as conllict resolution 
mechanism. Not that far away we see Lhe traditional warfare af warrior 
castes, disciplined, built around values of courage and honor. Then we can 
smell the trail of blood produced by efficient Clausewitzian modem warfare 
«with ali necessary means», as mentioned above. 
And more recently, maybe the last generation, a ncw phenomcnon has 
come up lhat may be referred to as post-modern warlare. The parties are 
equipped with suffieient destructive eapability for hundreds of years of 
warfare 01' the old kinds. But they do not unleash ali 01' that against eaeh other, 
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ar more precisely, against the military on the other side. They hold back; but 
only in the sense 01' not meeting directly in battle. They may leave the fighting 
to others, eg., in the Third world, an appropriate name for the place where 
third parties live. 
ar, even more cowardly: they may use their weapons to kill civilians, ar 
the unprotected military, on the other side. The Indochina wars and the Gulf 
war offer good examples 01' how winning a war means having fewer casualties 
than the other side; paying little or no attemion to the horrors suffcred by the 
other millions, hundreds 01' thousands killed, wounded, bereaved. Unfortunately, 
this logic is compatible with defensive defensc, as can be seen in the endemic 
warfare in ex-Yugoslavia, a country quite far advanced in (relatively) defensivc 
territorial defense. 
Hence, for internai contlict, today the normal, dominanl type 01' violent 
conOict, the outlook is problematic. CMD and PMD above have as their 
condition that arms are distributed in the population in advancc, but in smaller 
doses, like the Swiss army guns at home, as opposcd to the big arsenais thal 
can be conquered. The military would come in as the ultima ratio regis when 
ali social order breaks down. the police is not capable 01' handling lhe problem 
and the nonviolenl capability available in the population for NMD has becn 
exhausted. 
An alternative would be to givc up the use 01' territorial borders for the 
internai/externai distinction, knowing how out 01' touch with reality such 
borders tend to be. Evcn ir inter-COUnl1)' conflicts decrease in relative 
frequency inter-nafiolZ connicts certainly do no1. Imagine that nations, and nal 
only countries, increased their capacity for defensive defense, above ali for 
NMD. Imagine that the peoples 01' ex-Yugoslavia resisted nonviolently, 
supported by volunteers from abroad, rather Ihan simply leaving, escaping, 
becoming silent witnesses from afar lo their own degradation short of physical 
death. 
NEW TASK 11: BROADENING OF PEACE-KEEPING FORCES 
A connict has come to the stage 01' physical violence. The parties seem 
unable ar unwilling to bring the violence under contro1. People suffer, outside 
intervention looks like the only way out, preferably invited, if needed also 
uninvited. Screams from the neighboring aparlment, a woman battered by a 
man, children by the parents, are also calls for outside action, into the privacy 
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01' the home. There is a doctrine 01' limited sovereignty, depending on how 
power is exercised; in the family, so also in the nation. 
The question is what to do, and how to do it. 
That the peaeekeeping role has been given to the military does not 
necessarily imply that they are adequately suited ar trained for that purpose. 
They may simply have been available, partieularly from democracies with 
internai peaee surplus so that armies ean leave not fearing a eoup back home 
in the meantime. Or there is a post Cold War military surplus. When violence 
is involved, experts on violence, knowledgeable 01' the ways 01' aeting and 
thinking 01' people of violence, will be called upon. 
There is something to that, in the same way as poliee often ask for lhe 
adviee of criminais to understand a crime better. But poliee do not limit 
themselves to this souree 01' insight. So let us think in terms 01' ways of 
expanding lhe range 01' training, and thereby adequacy, 01' peaeekeeping 
forces, aecepting fully that knowledge of means of violence is I/ecessary to 
understand better violent parties, and for Iimiled self-dercnse. Obviously, the 
kind 01' training needed to light a war only coincides with whal is necded to 
keep peace if the parties to the eonfliet are seen as cnemies, and that is not 
a suitable point 01' departure. 
How about trainillg in police methods for, for instance, crowd controI? 
The classieal «bobby», not the national seeurity poliee aeting as local rapid 
deployment forces, ar the village poliee who lrusls his own authority more 
than the hand~weapon hanging from his belt? Also, older 01' age. with more 
experience than a freshly minted soldier? Could the poliee and the military 
work together in sueh forces, ar would il be better to impart the lwo sels of 
training to one of them? In that case, is it obvious that the miJitary are better 
suited than, local poliee forces more trained in solving quarrels thall 
in keeping parties apart, and failing that to ShOOl al one, ar both, ar Wilh-
draw? 
How about training in l1onviolence, not 50 much in acts af noncooperation 
and civil disobedience as in positive nonviolence, conslrucLive action. ir 
somelimes mainJy symbolic? At the risk of sounding naive, how about 
training peaee-keepers in being humanly nice, not only correel, to the 
perpetrators of violence, thereby hoping to elieit more human aetion from 
them? How about trying to understand them? How abollt helping rebuilding 
immediately, trying to negate their violenee? 
How about trainin!', in conflic/ media/iofl, like knowing what to say in 
a roam with the fighting parties present, lilled with entirely justiliable hatred 
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- nOI merely being a senlry? Why should nol such skills be combinable also 
in lhe rank-and-file peace keeper, nol only in lhe higher ranks, if aI ali? 
How aboul halJ of lhe peace-keepers being women, assuming women on 
the average to be better suiled for building better human relalions, less 
obsessed wilh the hardware of peacekeeping and abstracl principies, and 
above ali less lrigger-happy? 
BUI would Ihal not change lhe ide. of peace-keeping complelely, away 
from keeping lo .Iso making and building peace? The answer is probably Ihal 
any slricl division Iike Ihal old one breaks down in practice anyhow, thal lhe 
besl would be to combine Ihese activities, Ihal peace is besl kepl if also made 
and buil!. 
Here are Iwo possible .ppraaches. 
LeI lO 000 dialogues b/assom. The lrue experls on a connicl are lhe 
inside participants, but their visions may be clouded by their stakes in the 
conflic!. Outside participants, diplomats, peace-keepers, peace workers, are 
the amateurs. They may learn, but their visions may also be c10uded by their 
stakes in the conflict, such as the national interests of the country ar group 
01' countries they come from, ar their personal interests in power ar a Nobel 
Peace Prize? How do we resolve Ihal dilemma? 
One way might be to let people speak, and listen to them. People speak 
anyhow; in Yugoslavia there must be thousands of dialogues every day about 
how to lransform the con!lic!. This enormous creativity is wasted: the world, 
including the inside participants, has been trained by media to Iisten to a 
handful of people fram the outside only and some leaders from the inside. 
Democr.cy is based on the ide. Ihat everybody has something to contribute, 
and a right to be taken seriously: ali brushed aside. 
Imagine thousands of volunteers from the outside coming to the conllicl 
area to organize and monitor people's dialogues. They would have to be trained 
in how to do i!. The dialogue does not have to be spoken, written depositions may 
also be made, as long as people contribute, both to the diagnosis 01' the canllict, 
the prognosis, and to the general fund of ideas about therapies. 
The prolocols of such encounters should then Ilow logelher, electronically 
for speed, aI some cenlral point, and be made publicJy available lo the world 
at large. There will be much noise, bUI also many gems. jewels. The proposals 
will be highly conlradiclory, as is to be expected in a conflic!. But there will 
be insighls much above whal olltside participants can come up with, often 
more distant from reality the higher the levei 01' the outside «mediators», as 
cJearly seen in Somalia and Yugoslavia. 
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To organize this is no small task. We are not talking about something 
relatively simple and mechanical, and yet problematic, Iike elections and 
election-observation. The outside organizers will have to be sensitive enough 
to the issues to be able to stimulate people's creativity, yet careful not to 
distort their messages. ldeally they should have crash courses in languages, 
ar leam how to work through interpreters with the additional problems this 
entails. Moreover, they must know how to handle the networks, hamessing 
the f10w of ideas, letting the small creeks from distant villages flow into the 
rivers that have to combine into a pool of conflict insights, available to alI. 
But could this not be done in a much simpler way by hiring a polling 
agency? Definitely not, that would only tap a person's thinking in isolation. 
The point is the dialogue, with different sides of the conflict present, so as 
to have the thinking exposed to the arguments of the other side; and 
nevertheless guided, by gentle prodding, toward a brain-storming on possible 
remedies. To argue that this would also serve the function of «letting off 
steam» is an insult when only said about common people, not also of those 
higher up. The best is to lake people seriously. 
Hostages for peace. One experience from Nicaragua during the contra-
-sandinista fighting was that villages with foreigners living as hostages for 
peace were spared: people out to do violence do not want the world to witness 
what they do, nor do they wanl to be held accountable for killing foreign 
wilnesses. The approach carries risks, but probably not much more so than 
participation in the almost unarmed UN peacekeeping forces, whieh in tum 
is much less risky Ihan participation in UN Chapter 7 type enforcement 
action. 
So, imagine 100000 such hostages, densely settled in eonniet areas, so 
densely thal there is almost no space left for fighting, whieh afler ali is a 
territory-intensive aClivily. 
There would have to be Iife-Iines of support, like for the 39 000 UN 
troops stationed in Yugoslavia. Needless to say, ai the same time as being 
hostages they could also do peace work through dialogues, as indieated above. 
The two tasks would actually reinforee each other. 
The problem is where to find these 100000. Volunteerism would produee 
only small numbers of people and money; the state would have to come lo 
the aid of civil society in lhis malter. One possibilily is conscientious 
objectors, now about 20% in Italy, and much above that number in lhe 
conscript cohort in Germany. They have a right to work for peaee, not only 
to be shunted aside in «civil service», more ar less meaningfully. 
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Another possibility would be military, but not in uniform - at most some 
standard highly civilian clothing with white as the dominant color; more like 
doctors than like soldiers. And the very best would be lhe two together, 
blurring that distinction. 
However, regardless of how that is done there is one basic point to be 
made in this connection. When human beings lived as hunter-gatherers it 
looks as if the men did most of the hunting, aod the women most of the 
gathering. There is a clear lineage here to the military in lraditional, modem 
and post-modem societies: they are predominantly male, the country at 
present trying to break even the taboo againsl women in combat roles being 
the USA. As a consequence, when soldiers are male, so are the conscientious 
objectors; the implication being that basing these important conflict work 
roles on soldiers and conscientious objectors only would be one more 
expression of patriarchy. 
Hence, for every male recruited into such roles eiforts should be made 
to recruit one female. One way of doing 50 may be through a general national 
service, the valid objection5 being: 
[I] this is compulsory and extends state power, and 
[2] this would mainly be for the young who might have insufficient life 
experience to be suited for conflict work. 
Another model would be the peace corps model, like in the USA or 
Norway. People volunteers, both genders, ali ages: the state covers the 
ex penses. The name is already a good one; as a matter of fact, eonflict work 
as indicated above might give that name substance. In addition, the development 
funetioos so far associated with the peace corps eould also be useful here. 
There is always development work to do, including for the rebuilding of war-
-tom societies. And there would be no distinction between those who reject 
any form of violence, and those who, like the present author, believe in peace 
by peaceful means; including defensive defense and broadly based 
peacekeeping. 
Johan Galtung 
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